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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
W I L L I A M WA^ 
W E L L W O O P 
Plaintiff- A ppellant, 
-vs-
J O H N W. T U R N E R , Past Warden, 
and S A M U E L W. S M I T H , Present 
Warden, Utah State Prison, < I al 
Defendant-Respondev /. 
"ase No. 
i.> >0 
B R I E F ()l R E S P O N D E N T 
S T A T E M E N T O F 
T H E N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from a denial of petition for writ 
of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 72, Part I X of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
Petition for writ of habeas corpus was heard be-
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fore the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, on September 27, 
1973, in Case No. 210613. Petition was denied October 
9, 1973. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks that the lower court's decision 
be affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On October 14, 1971, at approximately 9:00 p.m., 
two men robbed Joe's Husky Station at 2100 South 
and Third East in Salt Lake City (T. 5,6). One of the 
men, described by the victim Robert A. Barney as Cau-
casian, about thirty, five feet, eight inches in height, 
weight around 150 to 175 pounds, receding hairline, 
long hair, long sideburns, and drooping mustache (T. 
7), held a distinctive sawed-off shotgun (T. 21,22) 
with an unusual pistol grip to the midsection of the 
victim, while the other man, described as Caucasian, 
about thirty, fairly large (250 pounds), six foot four, 
receding hairline, long sideburns, big drooping mustache 
(T. 10-14), opened the service station cash box and took 
money, a credit card, belonging to Mortensen Furni-
ture, and other valuables (T. 18). The two men escaped 
in a light colored automobile (T. 84). 
On October 16, 1971, police officers, led by an 
informant familiar with the petitioner-appellant's acti-
vities, went to a "motorcycle club" located at First West 
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and Fifth South. There the informant pointed out peti-
tioner-appellants as the robbers of Joe's Husky Station. 
Police officers, noting that petitioners closely fit the 
description of the robbers as given by the victim and 
noting a car parked behind the "club house" fitting the 
description of the getaway car, arrested petitioners with-
out a warrant. Incident and contemporaneous with this 
arrest, police officers searched the room in which peti-
tioner Harris was found and also the room in which peti-
tioner Wellwood was found (T. 58). In the latter room, 
officers found a distinctive sawed-off shotgun with a 
pistol grip. Officers also obtained from petitioner Harris 
a Husky Oil Company credit card belonging to Morten-
sen Furniture. 
Petitioners were tried January 12 and 13, 1972, 
before a jury which found them guilty of robbery. Each 
were sentenced to an indeterminate term provided by 
law. 
Counsel for petitioners filed notice of appeal from 
the trial court decision. Subsequently, petitioners volun-
tarily elected to forego the appeal; in return, Case Nos. 
23869, 23870, and 23871, were dismissed against them. 
On September 27, 1973, a full hearing was given 
for petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On 
October 9, 1973, the petition was denied. On November 
21, 1973, a notice of appeal from the denial of the peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus was filed with this Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E W R I T OF H A B E A S CORPUS I S 
NOT A P R O P E R R E M E D Y U N D E R 
T H E FACTS OF T H I S CASE. 
Appellant alleges several issues in his brief for 
which he seeks review. All these issues were known to 
petitioner at the time of his commitment to the Utah 
State Prison, yet he voluntarily elected to forego the 
appeal in exchange for dismissal of three cases against 
him. According to Utah law, the proper procedure 
should have been to appeal his sentence. 
Appellant is trying to use the writ of habeas corpus 
as a means of appeallate review. This is not the purpose 
for which the writ was established. In Bryant v. Turner, 
19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967), this Court held: 
"The writ is, as our rules describe it, an 
extraordinary writ,, to be used to protect one 
who is restrained of his liberty where there 
exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the 
requirements of the law have been so ignored 
or distorted that the party is substantially and 
effectively denied what is included in the term 
'due process of law,' or where some other cir-
cumstances exists that it would be wholly un-
conscionable not to re-examine the conviction." 
Id. at 286-287, 122, 123. 
When the same facts alleged in a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus are known to the petitioner at the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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time of his judgment, his proper remedy is not a writ. 
In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 
(1968), the petitioner contended that he was denied the 
right to counsel, and that he did not understand the 
consequences of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court 
of Utah held that the petitioner was not entitled to the 
habeas corpus remedy: 
"If the contention of error is something 
which is known or should be known to the party 
at the time the judgment was entered, it must 
be reviewed in the manner and within the time 
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack, except in some such unusual 
circumstances as we have mentioned above. 
Were it otherwise, the regular rules of pro-
cedure governing appeals and limitations of 
time specified therein would be rendered im-
potent." Id. at 98-99, 969. 
In Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 
343 (1970), the petitioner charged with the crime of 
robbery withdrew his plea of not guilty, plead guilty 
and did not appeal from the judgment and sentence. 
Instead he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging 
that at the time of his change of plea, he was not advised 
of the consequences of his plea of guilty, and that his 
counsel inadequately defended him. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that the writ of habeas corpus could not be 
used as a means of appellate review, and affirmed de-
nial of the writ. 
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In the case of Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 
428, 497 P.2d 34 (1972), the defendant plead guilty to 
burglary upon dismissal of two similar charges. H e peti-
tioned for a writ of habeas corpus after his time for 
appeal had expired claiming (1) his plea was involun-
tary and unintelligent and (2) his counsel was incompe-
tent. This Court held that both points could have been 
argued on a regular appeal, and that the writ of habeas 
corpus may not be used as a substitute for such appeal. 
In the present case, the defendant's attorney, who 
the lower court described as "adequate, if not excellent," 
filed a timely notice of appeal following the defendant's 
conviction. Subsequently the defendant voluntarily 
elected to forego the appeal in return for the dismissal 
of Case Nos. 23869, 23870, and 23871, against him. 
Defendant now seeks to reap the benefits of his bargain 
and dismiss its disadvantages. 
For the above reasons, the petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in this case is an improper remedy, and 
the decision below should be affirmed. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E A P P E A L W A S NOT F I L E D 
W I T H I N T H E T I M E S T I P U L A T E D 
W I T H I N R U L E 73(a) O F T H E U T A H 
R U L E S O F CIVIL P R O C E D U R E A N D 
S H O U L D T H E R E F O R E B E D I S -
M I S S E D . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 73(a), 
stipulates: 
"The time within which an appeal may 
be taken shall be one month from the entry of 
the judgment or order appealed from. . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson denied petitioner's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 9, 1973, 
and stipulated within the written denial, that petitioner 
had thirty days to appeal the decision to the Utah 
Supreme Court. A copy of Judge Hanson's denial was 
delivered to the defendant. 
On November 21,1973, one month and twelve days 
after Judge Hanson's denial, petitioner filed this notice 
of appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, Petitioner did 
not previously file a timely motion to terminate the run-
ning of time, nor does the petitioner now attempt to 
demonstrate excusable neglect based on a failure of a 
party to learn of the entry of judgment. This appeal, as 
stands, has not followed the stipulated procedure re-
quired, by law, to be followed in such appeals and, there-
fore, should be dismissed. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E S E A R C H A N D S E I Z U R E W A S 
I N C I D E N T TO A L A W F U L A R R E S T ; 
T H U S , T H E E V I D E N C E S E I Z E D 
P U R S U A N T T H E R E T O W A S P R O P -
E R L Y A D M I T T E D I N T R I A L . 
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A. T H E P O L I C E O F F I C E R S H A D 
P R O B A B L E CAUSE TO M A K E T H E 
A R R E S T . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3(3) (1953), allows a 
peace officer to make a warrantless arrest: 
"(3) When a felony has in fact been 
committed, and he has reasonable cause for be-
lieving the person arrested to have committed 
it." 
In State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 
(1969), this Court established the standard of reason-
able or probable cause prior to an arrest without a war-
rant: 
"The requirements, as in so many areas 
of the law, is one of reason: that it be shown 
that under the facts and circumstances known 
to the officer, a reasonable and prudent man 
in his position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense." 
Id. at 261. 
The arresting officers had sufficient facts to reason-
ably believe petitioner had indeed committed the offense. 
An informer, familiar with the petitioner's activities, 
told the police that he believed petitioners had committed 
several armed robberies in the area and pointed out 
petitioners when police investigated the motorcycle club. 
The United States Supreme Court held in Draper 
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v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329 (1958), 
that when the information given by an informer is "per-
sonally verified" then the arresting officers had "reason-
able grounds" to believe that the remaining unverified 
bit of information—that Draper had committed a felony-
was likewise true. The police officers were personally 
directed by the informant to the petitioners and took 
the petitioners into custody only after the informant 
personally pointed the petitioners out as the robbers. 
The two petitioners fit the description given by victims 
of the robberies in their size, hair style, appearance, and 
clothing. A car, fitting the description of the getaway 
car in the numerous robberies, was parked near the club-
house. Relying upon the personal identification by the 
informant, and their own observation as to the similari-
ties between petitioner, petitioner's car and the descrip-
tions given by the victims of the robberies, the officers 
had reasonable grounds to make the arrest. Such arrest, 
respondent contends, was clearly valid. 
B. T H E S E A R C H O F T H E "CLUB-
H O U S E " A N D P E R S O N O F D E F E N -
D A N T W A S I N C I D E N T TO A N D CON-
T E M P O R A N E O U S W I T H NORMAL 
V A L I D A R R E S T P R O C E D U R E S A N D 
T H E R E F O R E E V I D E N C E OBTAIN-
E D W A S P R O P E R L Y S E I Z E D . 
In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964*), 
the Court stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Unquestionably, when a person is law-
fully arrested, the police have a right, without 
a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous 
search of the person of the accused for weapons 
or the fruits of or implements used to commit 
the crime. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383,392 (1914). Angellov. United States, 269 
U.S. 20, 30 (1925). This right to search and 
seize without a warrant extends to things under 
the accused's immediate control, Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925), and, 
to an extent depending on the circumstances 
of the case, to the place where he is arrested. 
(Citations.)" 376 U.S. at 367. 
The Court went on to point out: 
"The rule allowing contemporaneous 
searches is justified, for example, by the need 
to seize weapons and other things which might 
be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, 
as well as by the need to prevent the destruction 
of evidence of the crime. Things which might 
easily happen where the weapon or evidence is 
on the accused's person or under his immediate 
control." 376 U.S. at 367. (Emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court, in Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 725 (1969), indicated that no mechanical 
formula can be looked to in deciding the legality of a 
search conducted without a warrant and incidental to 
an arrest. Rather, the reasonableness of the search, and 
therefore its legality, is dependent upon the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the particular case. This 
Court has applied the Chimel standard for some time. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 
(1968), this Court stated: 
"The question to be answered is whether 
under the circumstances the search or seizure 
is one which fairminded persons knowing the 
facts, and giving due consideration to the rights 
and interests of the public, would judge to be 
an unreasonable or oppressive intrusion against 
the latter's rights." 21 Utah 2d at 274 and 275. 
In light of the Chimel and Criscola cases, the 
legality of the search must be decided on its reasonable-
ness based upon the precise facts which exist in the 
instant case. (See also State v. Gibson, 459 P.2d 22 
(Wash. 1969).) 
The search following petitioner's arrest was valid 
for several reasons. First, it was necessary for the pro-
tection of the police officers. Several of defendant's 
friends, who might have been hostile to the police officers, 
were in and around the building. Petitioner Wellwood 
was actually in the room in which the sawed-of f shotgun 
was found at the time police officers first saw him. 
(Trial transcript of State v. Wellwood and Harris, 
Case No. 23868, at page 58, lines 7-9). Therefore, the 
officers were entitled to " seize weapons . . . which might 
be used to assault an officer and effect an escape." 
Second, the officers were required to seize weapons 
used to commit a crime. The victims of the several rob-
beries had described the robber's weapon as a unique 
sawed-off shotgun with a pistol-grip stock. Upon find-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ing such a weapon, pursuant to the taking in custody 
of suspects fitting the description of the said robbers, 
the officers were obligated to seize the gun as evidence 
of the crime. 
Third, the officers, acting as reasonable and prudent 
men under the circumstances, were entitled to seize the 
Husky Oil Company credit card of Mortenson's Furni-
ture. The credit card was reported as the fruits of a 
crime and, as such, was evidence of the crime. To pre-
vent the easy destruction of the thin, plastic card, the 
officers acted reasonably and responsibly by taking the 
evidence from the petitioner. 
In light of the above, it is clear that the officers 
had probable cause to arrest the petitioners and that the 
following search was incident to and contemporaneous 
with the arrest for purposes of protection and preventing 
a possible loss of pertinent evidence necessary to obtain 
a conviction. 
Based on the facts of this case, the respondent sub-
mits that the arrest was lawful and that the trial court 
acted correctly in admitting the gun and credit card as 
evidence. 
P O I N T I V 
T H E P H O T O G R A P H I C I D E N T I F I -
CATION O F T H E P E T I T I O N E R S B Y 
T H E V I C T I M W A S N O T P R E J U D I -
CIAL A N D W A S P R O P E R L Y AD-
M I T T E D A T T R I A L . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The facts prove that the showing of certain photo-
graphs (mug shots), from which appellant was identi-
fied as one of the robbers of Joe's Husky Station, was 
not a lineup as used in Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-13-37, 
38, and 39, and need not follow the procedure prescribed 
therein. The facts further prove that the presentation 
of photographs was fair, as it included pictures of dif-
fering physique and stature. Mr. Rhode, counsel for 
the appellant, reviewed the pictures and raised no ob-
jection to their fairness or admissibility in trial. 
The admissibility of this extra-judicial evidence 
is supported by decisions of this Court. Chief Justice 
Callister, speaking for this Court in State v. Jiron, 27 
Utah 2d 21, 492 P.2d 983 (1972), held: 
"Evidence of an extra-judicial identifica-
tion is admissible, not only to corroborate an 
identification made at the trial, but as indepen-
dent evidence of identity. Unlike other testi-
mony that cannot be corroborated by proof of 
prior consistent statements unless it is first 
impeached, evidence of an extra-judicial identi-
fication is admitted regardless of whether the 
testimonial identification is impeached, because 
the earlier identification has greater probative 
value than an identification made in the court-
room after the suggestions of others and the 
circumstances of the trial may have intervened 
to create a fancied recognition in the witness' 
mind . . . The extra-judicial identification tends 
to connect the defendant with the crime, and 
the principal danger of admitting hearsay evi-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dence is not present since the witness is avail-
able at the trial for cross-examinations." Id. 
at 22-23.1 
In the instant case, the witness made positive identi-
fication of both defendants at the time of the presenta-
tion of photographs and corroborated that identification 
in the courtroom during trial. The defendant's counsel, 
Mr. Rhode, did not object, at any time, to the photo-
graphic evidence or identification nor to the witness' 
identification within the courtroom. I t is believed that 
the defendants were not deprived of any constitutional 
rights, that the identification was fair and proper, and 
that the lower court's decision on this point should be 
affirmed. 
P O I N T V 
T H E R E C O R D S H O W S NO M O T I O N 
TO S E V E R M A D E B Y A P P E L L A N T . 
The record gives no indication that petitioner, or 
petitioner's counsel, ever made a motion to sever. The 
burden to show such evidence is upon the appellant. 
{Maxwell v. Turner, 23 Utah 2d 12, 455 P.2d 912 
(1969).) When the appellant fails to provide an ap-
propriate record, the court need not take cognizance 
of it. 
Since petitioner did not make timely objection to 
1
 Mr. Justice Traynor, People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal.2d 555, 
559-560, 191 P.2d 1 (1948). 
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the court's joining o fthe two cases at the time of trial, 
it should not be considered now or on appeal from a 
denial of a writ of habeas corpus. 
POINT VI 
A P P E L L A N T S ATTIRE D I D NOT 
PREJUDICE H I S APPEARANCE IN 
COURT. 
The facts show that appellant was dressed in a civil-
ian shirt, denim pants, and tennis shoes. This court, in 
State v. Archuletta, 28 Utah 2d 255, 501 P.2d 263 at 
264 (1972), a similar fact situation, held that such dress 
was not unusual for young men and not necessarily as-
sociated with jails. The Court stated: 
"Even if it were, it does not strike us that 
there would be anything strange, shocking, or 
prejudicial if the jury became aware that a 
man who had been arrested and charged with 
robbery was in custody and being held in jail." 
In Archuletta, this Court followed closely the decision 
in Gregory v. United States, 365 F.2d 203, 205 (9th 
Cir. 1966), in which it was ruled that a view of the de-
fendant in handcuffs by two members of the jury was 
not prejudicial error. The Court ruled: 
"To justify a new trial this alleged error 
must appear to have seriously affected the 
fairness of the trial. The burden of proof to 
sustain this allegation is on the appellant. The 
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handling of the defendant during the trial is 
best regulated by the trial court and is a matter 
for its sound discretion. For this court to ques-
tion the discretion of the trial court, the record 
needs to show something more than mere fact 
defendant was handcuffed in the presence of 
the jury." 
In the present case, appellant has not demonstrated 
that he was in attire that the jury viewed as "jail cloth-
ing," that such attire was unduly prejudicial to his case, 
nor that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing 
appellant to be tried in such garb. 
Furthermore, neither the appellant nor his counsel 
objected to the disputed attire at the time of trial. Re-
spondent feels that the matter of defendant's clothing 
at trial is a procedural right and like many other pro-
cedural rights, it may be lost if not properly asserted. 
Following this Court's decision in State v. Fair, 28 
Utah 2d 242, 501 P.2d 107 (1972), respondent believes 
appellant's failure to make timely objection at the trial 
disallows appellant's assertion of prejudicial error at 
this time. The lower court's decision should be affirmed. 
P O I N T V I I 
A P P E L L A N T W A S G I V E N A F U L L 
A N D F A I R E V I D E N T I A R Y H E A R -
I N G . 
In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1962), a case 
revolving around the admission of a murder confession 
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by a narcotic addict under a "truth serum," the Su-
preme Court held: 
"Where the facts are in dispute, the 
federal court in habeas corpus must hold an 
evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did 
not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing 
in a state court . . . In other words, a federal 
evidentiary hearing is required unless the state 
court trier of facts has, after a full hearing, 
reliably found the relevant facts." Id. at pages 
312 and 313. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court pointed out by footnote: 
"In announcing this test we do not mean 
to imply that the state courts are required to 
hold hearings and make findings which satisfy 
this standard, because such hearings are gov-
erned to a large extent by state law." Id. at 
footnote 9, page 313. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the standard of Townsend does not apply to 
state writ of habeas corpus proceedings and petitioner's 
claim is groundless. But even if such a test did apply, 
petitioner would still be without cause as the court's 
procedure stayed well within the Supreme Court's test. 
The record as a whole amply supports the respondent's 
contentions that: 
(1) The merits of the factual dispute were re-
solved in the lower court hearing. 
2. The lower court factual determination is fairly 
supported by the record. 
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(3) The fact-finding procedure employed by the 
court was adequate to afford a full and fair hearing. 
4. There was no substantial allegation as to new 
evidence. 
(5) The material facts were developed at the court 
hearing. 
The record shows that petitioner's counsel dynami-
cally and carefully represented the best interest of his 
client. He allowed the petitioner to give his own testi-
mony as to the events surrounding the facts of the crime 
and his arrest, developed facts favorable to the peti-
tioner, and challenged the incriminating (and ultimately 
convincing) testimonies of other witnesses. 
Throughout the proceeding, the court remained 
open to all testimony and even questioned the witness 
himself to reveal all facts surrounding the allegations 
of the petitioner. (See District Court hearing transcript, 
Case No. 210612, pages 2 through 7 and especially pages 
11-13 for petitioner Well wood's extensive and candid 
interrogatory with the court. See pages 7-11 for peti-
tioner Harris's testimony.) At the end of each peti-
tioner's testimony, the court inquired as to whether the 
petitioner had anything further to say. (Id., page 11, 
lines 11 and 28-29.) 
Respondent believes that petitioner's hearing in the 
district court was fair and proper in all respects. 
P O I N T V I I I 
T H E F O U R T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T 
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DOES NOT EXEMPT APPELLANT 
FROM FOLLOWING PRESCRIBED 
PROCEDURES. 
The law, in essence, is the system of order within 
our society. To maintain effeciency in justice, there 
must be order within the law itself. This is achieved by 
the adoption of certain rules of procedure, without which 
law, and society, would succumb to chaos. 
Procedure should never dominate justice. This 
Court relized the important balance between the two in 
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 
Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965). There Justice 
Crockett stated: 
"I t is true that our new rules of civil pro-
cedure were intended to eliminate undue em-
phasis on technicalities and to provide liber-
ality in procedure to the end that disputes be 
heard and determined on their merits. How-
ever, this does not mean that procedure before 
the courts has become entirely 'without form 
and void.' The law itself is a system of rules 
designed to safeguard rights and preserve 
order. This can be accomplished only by com-
pliance with the rules established for that pur-
pose." Id. at 409, 704. 
(See also Holton v. Holton, 121 Utah 451, 243 P.2d 
438 (1952).) 
Appellant claims no mistake, excusable neglect, 
or any other ground which has caused this Court, here-
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tofore, to liberally construe the rules. Appellant makes 
no reference to state or federal laws or cases which sup-
port appellant's contention. For these reasons, respon-
dent prays that this point be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, respondent prays 
that the lower court's decision denying petitioner's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
E A R L F . D O R I U S 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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